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"De plus, le roi et ses ministres jugeaient commode de proceder par 
decisions individuelles, plus souples qu'une loi generate, plus faciles a 
adapter aux circonstances de fait." Thus Boyer, in his La Liberte in- 
dividuelle sous L'Ancien Regime, rather delicately sums up the more 
appealing motivations and the contemporary justification for that now 
prominent exhibit in the criminological chamber of historic horrors 
the king's lettres de cachet.' But if that particular variety of legal process 
is now dead, the urgencies adduced to support it survive. Not only is 
individualization of the disposition of offenders inscribed on the banner 
of many a modern school of criminology. It is a primary article of 
faith in a movement which, when it becomes possible to look back on 
the present stage in the evolution of what we call criminal justice, will 
probably be recognized as overshadowing all other contemporary phenom- 
ena in its influence on that evolution. The movement consists in the 
infiltration of psychiatry -and of psychiatrists-into the administra- 
tion of the criminal law. It is of course understood that participants in 
this movement look to individualization for the fulfillment of perfectly 
reputable ends which have nothing in common with that malevolent 
despotism commonly attributed in our schoolbooks and on the Fourth 
of July to the lettres de cachet and similar royal prerogatives. But so, 
if Boyer and other informed interpreters of the Ancien Regime are to 
be believed, were many contemporary proponents of the lettres de cachet.2 
tAssociate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
This article is based on a paper presented at the Round Table on Crimes, Association 
of American Law Schools, Chicago, December 29, 1936. 
1. Faculty de Toulouse, LES GARANTIES DES LIBERTES INDIVIDUELLES (1933) 1, 21. 
2. As justification for a great number of lettres de cachet Boyer lists: (1) the 
situation where the social rank or influence of the offender might have precluded a con- 
viction by an ordinary court; (2) the desirability of avoiding the scandal of a public 
trial in certain instances; (3) the existence of cases with respect to which the courts 
which would normally have exercised jurisdiction were avowedly biased; (4) the inade- 
quacies and delays of the regular criminal procedure; (5) the utility of the lettre de 
cachet in cases where the offender would have taken flight before an ordinary warrant 
could have been procured; (6) cases where application of the general laws would have 
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The situation was simply that the lettres, justifiable for many purposes, 
unfortunately lent themselves under pressure to certain unfortunate 
abuses. 
This suggestion of a parallelism of rationale between the discredited 
lettres de cachet and the individualization of disposition sponsored by the 
representatives of psychiatry in their dealings with criminal law raises 
some interesting questions. Can the practice of individualization be so 
conditioned as to escape the abuses with which it became associated during 
the Ancien Regime, and if so what factors will determine the outcome? 
Has psychiatric participation to date been characterized by an adequate 
awareness of these critical factors, or must its role still be considered 
ambiguous? 
The participation has proceeded thus far in an atmosphere frequently 
receptive, at times suspicious, but rarely critical. Perhaps because its 
relevance has appeared so obvious, or perhaps because a different mood 
would be so alien to the whole temper of the group responses which 
comprise criminal law and its administration, there has been a disinclina- 
tion toward close study of the contributing role of this fresh ingredient. 
The beneficent effects of cross-fertilization have been assumed. For rea- 
sons which will appear, however, it is high time that the process of ap- 
praisal were begun. To that object this inquiry will be devoted. The 
terms employed to characterize the subject-psychiatry and criminal jus- 
tice -are of course freighted with diverse meanings, not all of which 
are here intended. Some preliminary indications may therefore be in 
order. Let psychiatry denote not merely the medical specialty as such, 
along with its agents, but also the various and sundry lay attitudes and 
orientations which are popularly and effectively, if indiscriminately, asso- 
ciated with the field of medicine. in question. Criminal justice may be 
understood as shorthand for that group of dominant culture-patterned 
responses to what we call crime. The subject of these responses, which 
is to say crime, means simply those varieties of behavior or of manifest 
allegiance which are so experienced by dominant group elements as to 
touch off the ultimate or primitive defensive responses in question. 
I. 
An introductory hint of some of the possibilities implicit in the situa- 
tion may be afforded by a brief review of certain differences in tradition 
resulted in excessive rigor (parliamentary revolts during the eighteenth century which 
might have been punished as rebellion and lese-majeste, had less rigorous punishments 
not been possible by lettres de cachet; the cases of writers and pamphleteers who criticized 
the regime, and of duellists, with respect to whom punishments more lenient than those 
applicable under the general laws were similarly made possible); and (7) the lack of 
legislation authorizing the commitment of insane persons by regular court proceedings. 
Id., at 19-20. 
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and professional conditioning as between representatives of the law and 
of psychiatry. The medically trained expert, in his first contact with 
the problems involved in disposing of offenders, must inevitably find 
himself confronted with situations and issues essentially different in kind 
from those with which he, as a physician engaged in private practice, 
is familiar. He is called upon to make adjustments foreign to his prior 
professional conditioning, to develop awarenesses for which he has pre- 
viously had little need. Consider, for example, the adversary character 
of the criminal proceeding. In ordinary medical practice the physician 
contends for the most part with the malevolent processes of nature. The 
germ or disease which threatens his patient is not represented by another 
physician. Mankind in general cheers on the doctor's one-sided struggle. 
But in a criminal proceeding, the medical expert, even as the lawyer, is 
confronted by another representative of his own profession. His client's 
medico-legal difficulties are now fostered and aggravated by that other 
physician. A jury or some other equally human arbiter sits as final 
judge, and its whims, however lacking in scientific comprehension, must 
be satisfied. For a second point of difference, consider the issue of in- 
dividual liberty and the appropriate limits to governmental coercion. In 
ordinary medical practice the physician deals with his patient by invita- 
tion. It is customary to obtain consent to an operation. There seems 
to be little occasion for the taking of positions on the very issue which 
is paramount in every criminal proceeding. A third point of difference 
arises out of the circumstance that the administration of criminal law 
has long since become a state enterprise, whereas the distribution of 
medical advice and treatment is still largely a matter of private initiative 
and charity. From the circumstance of state enterprise, in conjunction 
with the coercive character of criminal justice, there arises in that realm 
a certain necessity for treating like offenders alike. Special therapeutic 
possibilities open to the physician in private practice when dealing with 
a luxury patient who can afford them- as, for example, psychoanalysis 
-are not likely to be available as incidents of a penal regime. 
With these preliminary observations let us proceed to examine the 
record. For participation by psychiatrists in every phase of its adminis- 
tration, while still far from a standard procedure, has ceased to be alto- 
gether a novelty. In some sections of the United States and in certain 
circles within the law enforcement hierarchy of any state it is less familiar 
than in others. But the history of its growth, here as abroad, already 
presents a rather comprehensive experience. The literature growing out 
of it is probably more bulky than any other, excepting the strictly legal, 
comprised in our criminology. More and more frequently its imprint 
is discernible in the day by day disposition of ordinary criminal cases 
as the associated point of view seeps down into the trial and police courts, 
editorial pages and popular magazines. This is not to say that the psy- 
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chiatrist has as yet attained as secure and commonly accepted a place in 
the administrative process of any jurisdiction as the older categories of 
participant, notably the police, prosecuting attorney, judge, jury, and 
press. Nor it is suggested that psychiatry, in its application to the prob- 
lems and business of criminal law administration, as yet affords any- 
thing approaching a highly developed and stable technique. Suffice it 
for purposes of this discussion that psychiatric participation has pro- 
gressed beyond the status of an utterly untried idea and may now be 
thought of as a tentatively appraisable actuality. 
The participation in question has assumed a great variety of forms. 
For a long time alienists have been permitted to give in evidence their 
expert opinions with respect to the sanity of any accused person who 
may seek to establish his irresponsibility; or of anyone who, whether 
acquitted of a criminal charge on grounds of insanity or never charged 
with any crime, faces a challenge to his right to remain at large rather 
than be committed to a state institution as insane or feeble-minded. Being 
dissatisfied with the type of investigation conducted and the mode of 
trial of the issue where these are left to such alienists as the parties liti- 
gant may be able or see fit to engage, some state legislatures have sought 
ways and means of insuring more impartial and competent psychiatric 
assistance to trial courts charged with the adjudication of such issues. 
Resulting legislation has usually taken the form of a direction that, in 
any case where an issue of responsibility is raised, the accused shall be 
examined before trial by members of the staff of a state hospital, or by 
court-appointed medical experts or "lunacy commissions." The Massa- 
chusetts Briggs Law of 1921 went further, requiring a routine examina- 
tion, by psychiatrists appointed by the Department of Mental Diseases 
of the Commonwealth, of all persons indicted for a capital offense and 
of all persons bound over or indicted who have previously been convicted 
of a felony or who have previously been indicted more than once for 
any offense.3 
Even where there is no question of complete irresponsibility, which 
is to say of "insanity," we find law enforcement officers, be they prose- 
cuting attorneys, judges, members of parole boards or governors with 
3. Mass. Acts 1921, c. 415. As amended [Acts 1923, c. 331; 1925, c. 169; 1927, 
c. 59; 1929, c. 105] the Act no longer provides for the admissibility of the psychiatrists' 
report in evidence, but does provide that it shall be "accessible to the court, the probation 
officer thereof, the district attorney and to the attorney for the accused." MASS. GEN. 
LAWS (1932) c. 123, 100A. For a discussion of this law in operation see Glueck, Psychi- 
atric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 632-648; Over- 
holser, The Practical Operation of the Massachusetts Law Providing For the Examina- 
tion of Certain Persons Accused of Crime (1928) 13 MASS. L. Q., No. 6, 35-49; Over- 
holser, The Massachusetts Statute For Ascertaining the Mental Conditions of Persons 
Coming Before the Courts of the Commonwealth in the Light of Recent Decisions (1931) 
16 MASS. L. Q., No. 6, 26-34. 
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the power of pardon, seeking psychiatric advice with increasing fre- 
quency, quite informally, and without reference to any particular statu- 
tory mandate. In certain courts this occasional practice has been insti- 
tutionalized and made a standard feature of the investigation of every 
case. In New York County, New York, for example, a psychiatric 
clinic has been established in connection with the Court of General 
Sessions to examine, before sentence or other final disposition, persons 
convicted of felony in that court. Similar clinical facilities have been 
made available in connection with some of our more modern juvenile 
and family courts. Many penal and reformatory institutions now have 
one or more psychiatrists to assist in the classification of prisoners for 
purposes of handling them within the institution and of determining 
their eligibility for parole. 
What is the significance of the foregoing developments? In one 
aspect they reflect a growing tendency to utilize a new and fascinating 
branch of medico-legal expertness. Insofar as we ask no more of the 
psychiatrist than we do of other forensic experts, namely, that he supple- 
ment the information otherwise available to law enforcement officers in 
connection with particular cases by contributing pertinent "scientific" 
or generalized facts presumed to be beyond the common knowledge and 
understanding of laymen, his participation can scarcely fail to be of 
value. The advantage of a more precise understanding in any given 
criminal case of the sort of person the offender is, of how and why he 
came to commit the offense in question, and of what may be expected of 
him in the future, in order to promote a more intelligent exercise of 
discretionary powers already vested in the authorities, may be deemed 
self-evident. Where psychiatric inquiry and report come to be legally 
recognized and required as standard phases of the investigation of a case, 
they may often have in addition a highly desirable collateral effect. An 
objective sanction may be afforded whereby the authorities may justify 
their action if it happens to run counter to unintelligent popular emotions 
aroused by the case or pressures of factional prejudice. The transforma- 
tion wrought in the emotional atmosphere surrounding a manhunt when 
an idea spreads that the perpetrator of the horrible crime may be men- 
tally "sick" is a familiar case in point. 
But the significance of the official representation accorded psychiatry 
and psychiatrists in the administration of criminal law cannot be lim- 
ited to the consequences outlined above. Consider the simple provision 
for the preparation and presentation of case histories and psychiatric 
reports to be taken into account by the court in disposing of an offender 
after plea or verdict of guilty. How much of the sort of information 
which will normally be included in such a report have our courts been 
accustomed to have before them in all but the few cases where a plea 
of insanity is interposed? How much of it, in the absence of the ad- 
This content downloaded from 128.36.173.215 on Wed, 22 May 2013 13:21:46 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
324 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.47: 319 
ministrative innovation in question, have they been accustomed or com- 
pellable to entertain? The Loeb-Leopold hearing on sentence, much 
publicized years ago, was far more elaborate and covered much more 
territory than the ordinary hearing. In that sense it was and remains 
definitely exceptional. If the information is entertained, what standards 
or practices exist with respect to the weight and effect to be accorded 
particular factors in the personality make-up or social picture of an 
accused who is not to be denominated "insane"? What, in short, is the 
court to do with the information in the ordinary case? With respect to 
most of these questions the answer is ready. Our courts and legislatures 
have conspicuously, if understandably, avoided committing themselves. 
There are no comprehensive standards. In some instances the legisla- 
tures have imposed a flat penalty applicable to all convicted of a given 
offense. More often they have been content to prescribe minima and 
maxima - frequently far removed - leaving to the trial court the prob- 
lem of determining what particular disposition within the statutory frame 
may be most appropriate in any given case. Trial courts have used their 
own judgment, without compulsion to retrace its exercise or rationalize 
the result in their memoranda of decision; and in any case these mem- 
oranda are generally not published in printed, available form. Appellate 
courts usually refuse to review the discretion of the trial court in matters 
of sentence, preferring to put reversals on other grounds save in the very 
occasional extreme case deemed to cry aloud for invocation of the Con- 
stitutional prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishments. Our 
parole boards likewise operate without any but the vaguest of statutory 
standards, and their decisions are in practical effect beyond the scope 
of judicial review.4 Mention should of course be made, by way of 
4. The terms of the Connecticut statute, to cite but one example, provide that: 
"Any person sentenced to the State Prison, after having been in confinement . . . for 
not less than the minimum term, or, if sentenced for life, after having been in confine- 
ment . . . for not less than twenty-five years, may be allowed to go at large on parole 
in the discretion of a majority of the board of directors of said prison and the warden 
thereof acting as a board of parole, if in their judgment such prisoner will lead an 
orderly life if set at liberty . . . " CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1931-1935) ? 1730c, 
amending CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) ? 6509. Under ? 6510 the Board is authorized "to 
establish such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary, upon which such convict 
may go upon parole, and to enforce such rules and regulations and to retake and reim- 
prison any convict upon parole, for any reason that shall seem sufficient to said Board." 
Over and above the utter vagueness of such standards, the convict who would 
litigate his eligibility to parole is confronted with the further obstacle that the granting 
of parole is treated as a highly discretionary act. State ex rel. Kay v. LaFollette, 222 
Wis. 245, 267 N. W. 907 (1936). The United States Supreme Court has indeed char- 
acterized it as "an act of grace" in a decision indicating that there is no constitutional 
right to a hearing on an issue of parole violation. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 
492 (1935). See also Gausewitz, The Proper Role of Legalism In the Administration 
of the Criminal Law (Paper presented at the Round Table on Crimes, Association of 
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exception, of those cases where the jury is entrusted by statute with 
discretion as to the sentence to be imposed. The question of what evi- 
dence, if any, may be relevant and admissible on the issue of sentence, 
though not on the issue of guilt, then becomes more difficult to avoid. 
But even with reference to such cases the legislatures have preferred to 
remain silent; and the courts, left to legislate for themselves, have tended 
to avoid any comprehensive consideration of the subject insofar as may 
be gleaned from their opinions.5 
It follows that provision for routine psychiatric examination and re- 
port carries with it a considerable broadening of the scope of the hearing 
on sentence, or of the hearing on parole, as the case may be. New 
elements for consideration are injected, and they are elements whose 
import and place in the sentencing picture have yet to be appraised and 
assimilated. The problem presented by each case becomes more compli- 
cated from the point of view of those charged with rendering the decision. 
This means substantive change. So it is that the participation of the 
psychiatrist cannot be compared with the much more subordinate role 
of other technical "experts" who are from time to time called in to 
give opinion evidence in the course of trials and hearings. Utilization 
of the services of those others-ballistics experts, medical examiners, 
chemists, examiners of questioned documents, engineers, and so on- 
is entirely compatible with a continuance of the status quo insofar as 
penal objectives and general policies are concerned. The psychiatrist, on 
the other hand, is commonly understood to represent a generalized ap- 
proach with respect to problems of personality and of human behavior 
quite at variance with the attitude finding expression in our criminal law 
as a whole. He carries this distinctive attitude with him when called 
upon to participate in the administration of criminal law. The result 
is ferment, for he naturally finds the issues as legally drawn somewhat 
irrelevant and for the same reason inadequate. He is moved to express 
his discontent and, being a physician and a scientist, wields the authorita- 
tive weight of his strongly entrenched profession. He has in conse- 
quence become the popular symbol of a growing demand for far-reaching 
transformation in our methods of dealing with convicted offenders. Psy- 
chiatry is looked to as the implement whereby this demand may be 
realized, and herein lies the major significance of the development noted 
at the outset of this article. Let us first examine the popular demand. 
American Law Schools, Chicago, Dec. 31, 1937), wherein some provision for more 
adequate and impartial hearings, held publicly and on due notice, for the orderly settle- 
ment of disputes arising in connection with applications for parole and similar release 
procedures, is urged. 
5. For an interesting discussion of sentencing policies, based on a review of the 
decisions, see L. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal: II (1937) 37 COL. L. 
REV. 762. 
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II. 
Just as the political ideology of industrialization has provoked a widen- 
ing of the regulatory spheres assigned to penal control, so the seeping 
of psychological and psychiatric conceptions into every-day thought has 
provoked a comparable expansion of penological expectations. One need 
hark back no further than the recollection of a generation still living 
to recall the period when decent and humane treatment of prisoners, the 
separation of juvenile from more hardened and older offenders, the 
elimination of excessively severe sentences and provision for prison 
work, comprised the platform of liberalism on this salient. It was the 
period when great things were expected from the institution of reforma- 
tories. Those were important reforms. The improvements on the exist- 
ing regime envisaged were substantial and, for that matter, remain far 
from accomplished in their entirety at the present day. But they were 
of a conservative modesty compared with the perspectives shortly there- 
after to take possession of the criminological imagination. 
The new phase opened officially in this country with the juvenile court 
movement early in the present century. In the nature of practically 
engineered reform the administrative implications of this development 
were not overstressed. Reliance was placed upon such appealing con- 
siderations as that offenders of tender years should be treated differently; 
that, they having been caught while still young and presumably im- 
pressionable, the procedure should be oriented toward their rehabilitation 
rather than mere punishment; and that educational and therapeutic forms 
of processing requisite to that end were accordingly indicated. The whole 
program being thus conceived in the delinquent's own interest, with the 
state moreover acting in loco parentis, the procedure was considered not 
at all "criminal" in character.6 Questions as to the exact nature and 
limits of the power exercised, having a tendency to invoke "technicali- 
ties" and thus cramp the progressive idea before it had been allowed 
time to work out in practice, were felt to be captious and out of order. 
Imbued with an entirely fresh ideology and terminology, the cultural 
ferment which divorced from the criminal law and its administration 
this great group of juvenile offenses, has for some time been working 
quite as visibly in the realm of adult offenses. Clarence Darrow's suc- 
cessful invocation of the psychiatric version in the Loeb-Leopold hearing 
on sentence afforded a straw to indicate the direction of the wind. Then 
came the recommendation so often since repeated that the whole function 
of passing sentence upon convicted offenders be taken out of the hands 
of courts of law and entrusted to commissions of experts or "treatment 
boards," composed of psychologists, psychiatrists, and perhaps others, 
6. The leading authorities are collected in Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United 
States (1927) 5 et seq. 
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to be guided by diagnosis of the offender rather than by statutory sen- 
tence frames and orthodox judicial reaction within those frames. In 
New York State Dr. Thayer, a psychiatrist appointed Commissioner 
of Correction during President Roosevelt's period of governorship, advo- 
cated a genuinely indeterminate sentence for felons, to avoid having to 
turn loose prospectively dangerous and incorrigible criminals "merely 
because a certain day on the calendar has come round," and to make 
it possible to let out on parole many who, while seeming to warrant such 
a chance, are under the present system foreclosed by life or long mini- 
mum sentences even though they happen, in some instances, to be first 
offenders. Probation success and failure have become favored themes 
for criminological research, inspired by the hope of arriving at scientific 
indicia to aid in the determination of parole eligibility. 
This shift of emphasis from the legal category of the offense to the 
personality of the offender, from mere insistence that criminals be caught 
and made to "pay their penalties"-preferably some happy mean between 
the sentimentally lenient and the revengefully harsh-to the more exacting 
standard that dispositions be rehabilitory where possible and otherwise 
preventive, is, of course, integrally tied up with what is gradually be- 
coming the general approach to problems of human conduct and per- 
sonality. It has been absorbed into everyday thought to such a point 
that when a youthful offender against whom action has once been taken 
subsequently gets in trouble, the tendency is to see in this an indication 
that the first disposition made was at fault. When an adult, after serving 
one or more sentences, goes on to commit further crimes there is the 
same tendency to see in this recidivism evidence of penological failure. 
The process comes, in short, to be judged by standards ever closer to 
those of formal education and medical therapy combined, and ever more 
far removed from the crude standards of criminal justice as we have 
known it. 
These new demands of course far outstrip any record of performance 
in the field. Individualization of disposition and rehabilitation of of- 
fenders, if by these slogans we mean something more than ordinary 
leniency, have to date been hatched out of idea into realization only in 
scattered instances and then usually under especially favorable conditions 
such as the concurrence of privately endowed welfare organizations. Not 
that this discrepancy should be particularly surprising; it is in the 
inherited tradition to assign a great deal more work to our agencies 
of criminal law administration than we would ever dream of equipping 
them to perform. Whenever a new regulatory program is enacted, or 
some new offense prohibited, a criminal penalty is usually provided as 
a matter of course and quite regardless of the subject matter and per- 
sonnel to be regulated. For the criminal penalty is the only ultimate 
sanction we know. But it has rarely been our custom when thus giving 
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new assignments of work to existing agencies of law enforcement to 
make corresponding provision at the same time for additional equip- 
ment, personnel, and operating expenses wherewith to carry out the as- 
signment. 
In a sense, therefore, what we have traditionally sought of criminal 
justice has been not so much actual as symbolic performance. We have 
long made provision for police agencies to apprehend offenders, but only 
on a scale to insure the apprehension of a random sample. We have for 
an even longer time provided a judicial machinery for their trial in 
accord with our best traditions, but again on a scale so limited that the 
great majority of those apprehended are relegated not to what the public 
and even law students are customarily taught to think of as the courts, 
but to perfunctory police tribunals rather meagrely endowed and techni- 
cally termed "inferior." We have set up reformatories and correctional 
homes for the supposedly less hardened offenders; but we have not 
thought of equipping them for their much more difficult educational 
task on anything like the scale of the public schools which deal with 
relatively well-adjusted young people. Some extremely ambitious and 
social-minded policies with respect to the handling of child offenders 
have graced our statute books for many years. State courts have vied 
with one another to sustain these Juvenile Court Acts in terms of the 
broadest and most advanced penological objectives of individualization 
and rehabilitation.7 But when the smoke cleared away it developed in 
many jurisdictions that the extremely ambitious and exacting function 
of administering the Acts had devolved as an incidental and almost ex 
officio duty upon part-time judges of preexisting "inferior" tribunals 
who had neither the time, training, nor equipment to qualify for the 
novel and highly specialized work which the Acts and supporting con- 
stitutional decisions purported to contemplate. Much the same theme 
has predominated in the realms of probation and parole. 
Comparably inconsistent attitudes on the part of an individual, if at 
all persistent, would of course be labelled psychopathic. This suggests 
the disturbing aspect of the situation. For we find an ever widening dis- 
crepancy in this field of government between what our society insists 
on expecting and the burdens which it is willing to assume to realize 
those expectations. That it is an unhealthy discrepancy is amply evi- 
denced by the atmosphere of mutual recrimination and distrust which 
envelopes the processes of criminal law administration, and by the in- 
creasing tendency of our communities in recent years to seek diagnoses 
of themselves in the form of crime surveys. The patient has come to 
7. In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 Pac. 467 (1924); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 
121 Atl. 678 (1923); Ex parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1911); 
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198 (1905). 
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regard himself as a problem case. But if the situation has its dangerous 
aspect there may also be implicit in it an opportunity. Maladjustment 
generates tension; and such tension affords what is probably the only 
known impetus for social growth. The condition is that impetus must 
be given direction. Dissatisfaction must be focussed upon what is basi- 
cally at fault rather than upon the scapegoats of defense mechanisms. 
How, then, is the impetus being directed? We have already observed 
that psychiatry appears to be popularly accepted both as the symbol of 
the desired new order and as the instrument for its attainment. We have 
noted numerous provisions for the appointment of psychiatrists as ad- 
juncts to juvenile and criminal courts, and to penal institutions; and for 
routine examination by them of various classes of offenders before final 
disposition. Much criticism has been concentrated on the substantive 
criminal law and, what is probably the same thing, the much bedevilled 
"legal mind." The M'Naghten formulae8 for instructing a jury on the 
issue of criminal responsibility and the formulae employed in the law 
of Mens Rea have likewise come in for a particular barrage, being again 
and again compared with the concepts of current schools of psychology 
to the supposed great disadvantage of the legal formulae. There has 
been much deploring of the "metaphysical jargon of the criminal law." 
It has been repeatedly urged that the function of fixing sentences be 
transferred from legally trained judges to "treatment boards" imbued 
with psychiatric and sociological points of view; and that indeterminate 
sentences take the place of existing statutory minima and maxima in 
order that individualized dispositions may be more feasible. Are these 
the appropriate points of focus? 
III. 
No one state has as yet conducted a thoroughgoing experiment along 
the lines suggested to demonstrate what may be expected from routine 
psychiatric diagnosis, treatment board sentences and institutional therapy 
within the framework of existing channels of disposition. In the mean- 
time, however, much that is suggestive can and has been learned from 
the scattered experiences of psychiatrists and clinics functioning here 
and there in connection with criminal law administration. In a few uni- 
versities experimental studies have been carried on by collaboration 
between lawyers and psychiatrists, employing as clinical material persons 
charged with a crime and awaiting trial, or persons already convicted 
but with respect to whose disposition difficult questions may have arisen. 
Such experimental clinics, when regularly conducted with a view to 
arriving at conclusions and recommendations concerning the disposition 
of the offender to be made by the court, naturally afford samples of the 
8. M'Naghten's case, 10 Cl. & F. 200 (Eng. 1843). 
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experiences and problems which a "treatment board" might be expected 
to encounter. The following observations are very largely based on 
the samples gleaned from one such experimental clinic conducted at Yale 
University over the past six years.9 
At the very outset it must be recognized that offenders can be dis- 
posed of only through existing public institutions and other available 
social and charitable agencies, and that the number and variety of these 
channels open to prosecutor and court in any given jurisdiction are ex- 
tremely limited. This is not to say that there is not a considerable amount 
of leeway within the institutional limitations. A broader understanding 
on the part of the prosecutor will in some instances lead him to discon- 
tinue a prosecution which he might otherwise have pursued, on condition 
that the offender, assuming that he is not without means, voluntarily 
seeks some indicated course of treatment at an appropriate private sani- 
tarium. Similarly the sentencing authority may be led to suspend sen- 
tence on appropriate conditions in cases where, with a less comprehensive 
grasp of the situation, a short jail or prison commitment would have 
been imposed with perhaps quite undesirable results. In other situations 
where comparative leniency is at present the rule, a better understanding 
of the offender's maladjustment and potentialities might lead to incarcer- 
ation for a period approaching the statutory maximum, as revealed by 
the subsequent records of some of those released on suspended sentences 
or paroled as soon as eligible suggest. But the possibilities along these 
lines are easily over-estimated. Many offenders most in need of psycho- 
therapy are without means, and few if any state or charitable institutions 
are equipped to afford anything approaching such treatment as a matter 
of penal routine. All too frequently the comprehensive and searching 
picture of an offender revealed by psychiatric case history and diagnosis 
will serve chiefly to bring out in bold relief the essentially primitive 
character of all the alternatives open for his disposition within existing 
institutional frames. 
To put it otherwise, the most cramping restrictions are not those en- 
countered in the "substantive" law, which is to say in the statutes and 
decisions defining offenses and prescribing maximum and minimum pen- 
alties. The history of the juvenile courts thus far is a leading instance 
in point. In those Acts removing youthful offenders from the jurisdic- 
tion of the criminal courts and decreeing for them a special regime, sub- 
stantive definition of offenses was reduced to a minimum. The principles 
of individualization and rehabilitation received full sanction. The whole 
approach of the traditional criminal law was repudiated, and discretionary 
9. This clinic is conducted as a seminar, in collaboration with Dr. Eugen Kahn, 
Professor of Psychiatry and Mental Hygiene in Yale University. It is of course to 
be understood that the views here expressed are but a by-product of that venture and 
the sole responsibility of the writer. 
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powers over the lives of the children such as had never before been con- 
ferred on any tribunal were vested in the juvenile courts. But in most 
jurisdictions no new courts were created as a matter of fact. No new 
and specially qualified judges were appointed. The administration of 
these revolutionary Acts was simply assigned as a more or less ex officio 
duty to existing petty criminal or probate courts. Appropriations for the 
investigative work and probationary supervision assumed in the Acts 
have more often than not been nominal. Rarely have public works pur- 
chase and building programs for child welfare accompanied enactment 
of the declaration of substantive policy. What has been the result? 
Where charitable welfare services of great variety and healthy endow- 
ment have been lacking, juvenile court judges have found the problem 
of working out common sense dispositions for the children brought be- 
fore them scarcely minimized by the broad provisions of the Acts. 
The dissatisfaction of psychiatrists and social workers brought into 
contact with the criminal law is therefore a by-product of an issue which 
cannot be adequately represented as a mere discrepancy between eight- 
eenth century legal-psychological dogma and modern conceptions of 
psychology and psychiatry. Those who appear to have assumed that it 
could be, have proceeded upon a curiously superficial understanding of 
the meaning and function of the legal formulae of responsibility and of 
intent, motive, deliberation, premeditation, wilfulness, heat of passion, 
adequate provocation, and the like, inherited though they are from the 
Common Law of a more primitive day. For the law is not, and never 
was, designed as a treatise on psychology or any one of the social 
sciences. Its formulae, while couched in terms of outmoded psychologi- 
cal concepts, reflect an underlying social policy with respect to the dis- 
position of offenders and the degree of collective responsibility toward 
the underprivileged and maladjusted which American communities are 
accustomed to assume, and which appears to be by no means as outmoded 
as the concepts in which it is expressed. 
One must, therefore, venture beyond the realm of medical science and 
of psychology and seek sanctions or justifications which they cannot 
supply, in an effort to determine not merely what can be done with a 
given offender as a practical matter of the moment but even what should 
be done with him under more satisfactory hypothetical conditions. The 
psychiatrist may be able to describe a given offender. He may shed 
considerable light on the factors which conditioned his development and 
present state. It is within his province to indicate to what extent the 
offender may prove amenable to treatment, and to what kind of treat- 
ment. For the offender is a human being -and therefore like and in 
the same sense as other human beings, a problem for the psychiatrist. 
But there existing science stops. What varieties of personality the com- 
munity shall take the trouble to maintain even though they have demon- 
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strated their inability to get along with the group, what individuals it 
shall undertake to rehabilitate at public expense, what forms of treatment 
shall be made available, what types of special environment shall be 
created for the purpose, and how any given program shall be set up, 
are primarily questions of social values and of politics very much akin 
to such major issues of recent years as those raised by unemployment 
and the care of the aged. 
Viewed in this light, what are the political and social implications of 
the demand that offenders be rehabilitated where possible, and in any 
case prevented from repeating? Satisfaction of this demand is of course 
dependent upon the possibility of making indeterminate commitments. 
These are sought to be justified on the assumption that "treatment" as 
opposed to "punishment" would be the order of the day; and that, in 
accord with the creed of the juvenile court, the compulsory process would 
therefore be as much in the offender's own interest as in that of the 
state. If it be considered further that it would be necessary to ignore 
the gravity or lack of gravity of the offense which happened to bring 
an offender into custody, inasmuch as the earlier offenses committed 
by persons who subsequently turn out to be the most incorrigible and 
dangerous offenders are often relatively insignificant from the point of 
view of the injury wrought upon others, it is evident that the inaugura- 
tion of indeterminate commitments would entail an extremely heavy 
responsibility on the part of organized society. Before one can weigh 
the advisability of delegating to local government agencies so pervasive 
a power over the private lives of the unfit, it is necessary to consider 
what is meant by "treatment" as applied to the problems of behavior 
and personality. 
The offenders with whom the criminal law has to deal are almost by 
definition far less adjusted to the dominant cultures and competitive 
strains of our society, and far more difficult to educate, than are the great 
majority of students served by such public educational institutions as we 
have been able to develop. Substantial percentages of these offenders 
are mentally disordered if not defective. To complicate matters further, 
moreover, the data indicate that there are more borderline cases of psy- 
chopathic and mentally defective personality than of psychosis or "in- 
sanity" in this group; and unfortunately psychopaths and defectives 
appear, generally speaking, to be on the one hand the least susceptible 
to treatment and, on the other, the most difficult to label as prospective 
recidivists or not with any great assurance. But such are the people 
who, taking the new penal demands at their face value, would have to 
be "treated." 
What, then, are the probabilities of rehabilitation through education 
and psychiatric therapy, and what institutional equipment does it pre- 
suppose? Perhaps the simplest and most familiar form consists in the 
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sort of educational regime associated with grade school and manual 
training classes, but specially adapted to the needs of retarded pupils. 
In the case of juvenile delinquents, for example, the misconduct which 
brought many to the state institution is closely allied with schoolroom 
and truancy difficulties. Special classes at the institution will sometimes 
serve to get them back on the track and enable them to catch up with 
their age group in the public school. In the Belgian women's prison at 
Brussels the simplest and most practical sort of training in how to 
"keep house" has been found rather efficacious in the cases of a good 
many mentally subnormal inmates who previously had not known how. 
But even these simpler forms of treatment require facilities which are 
the exception rather than the rule in our penal institutions. Teachers 
capable of handling these most difficult and retarded pupils are not the 
easiest to find. Orphan and reformatory colonies do not afford the most 
pleasant of environments to attract the teacher. Few states have sought 
to attract them, and certainly the public has manifested little interest, 
sentimental or financial, in prison education. 
With many offenders maladjustment is too complicated or deep-rooted 
to yield to any educational regime so simple as those described, even 
if we had them. What then? Numerous hospitals and sanataria, public 
and private, have existed for some time which purport to treat mental 
patients. These, and in particular the private institutions which take 
in patients who can pay their way, should afford some data to indicate 
the possibilities of therapy as applied to various types of patient. When 
such data or estimates have been so assembled as to provide a basis for 
discussion of penal administrative problems - something which has not 
yet been done - it will probably develop that "treatment" as distinguished 
from diagnosis is a more complicated matter than is generally appre- 
ciated. More often than not an extremely lengthy process is involved, 
stretching over years, and possible only in specialized environments or 
communities created for the purpose. Ultimate results are often quite 
unpredictable at the outset, and many subjects will never qualify for 
unconditional release. The process is not one which offers any imme- 
diate promise of being reducible to stereotyped procedures and fixed 
time schedules like formal education in the public schools. Clear-cut 
"cures" comparable to those produced within a short time by the appli- 
cation of the more familiar medical procedures to ordinary and better 
understood ailments are still beyond the reach of available psychiatric 
and neurological techniques. 
How difficult would be the resulting situation of a treatment or parole 
board operating under a genuinely indeterminate sentence law is appar- 
ent. The board would almost always be obliged to recognize that the 
psychopath or defective whose infractions to date were of a decidedly 
minor character might nevertheless conceivably commit more serious 
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offenses if released at any given time. But it could rarely predict this 
on a plane of reasonable certainty. The population includes a great many 
of these handicapped and potentially dangerous people, not all of whom 
by any means give trouble. Whether any given one of them will, or 
once having committed an offense, will go on to commit others of a 
more serious character, seems to depend largely on incalculable future 
patterns of environmental strain. Consider, for example, a case in New 
York City which attracted a great deal of attention about a year ago. 
The defendant was a seemingly puny and insignificant upholsterer's 
assistant with a petty police record of thefts, one of which had brought 
him a term in the Elmira Reformatory. On May 8, 1935, he plead 
guilty in the Court of General Sessions to stealing an automobile, and 
the Court had before it his record, including the report of a psychiatrist 
attached to the clinic mentioned in the beginning of this article. Excerpts 
from the report are as follows 10 
"He reveals no evidence of psychosis at the present time. This 
man is pleasant, agreeable and cooperative, and gives an adequate, 
coherent, relevant account of himself. Mood shows no abnormal 
variations. Hallucinations and delusions are not elicited. Attention 
is well sustained. Orientation is intact. Memory for remote and 
recent events is good. 
"No evidence of mental defect. His average intelligence compre- 
hension is normal. Judgment is somewhat distorted at times by his 
personality deviations. He is able to reason fairly adequately on 
indifferent material in which his personality is not concerned. School 
knowledge is fairly well retained. Contact with current events shows 
a limited circle of interest. His ability to profit by experience is 
somewhat handicapped by his personality. 
"A detailed analysis reveals he is a neurotic type of personality 
deviate. Apparently from early age this boy has lived in a world of 
unreality, built up largely from his own imagination, strengthened 
and fortified by the circumstances under which he lived as an only 
child. Father died at a critical period in child's psychological de- 
velopment. 
"He goes about in some ways without regard for circumstances 
or surrounding conditions, having a loose contact with reality. He 
shows numerous narcissistic tendencies and unusual fantasy forma- 
tions." 
Given this picture it is not surprising that the defendant received a sus- 
pended sentence and probation, and for a time nothing occurred to alter 
that picture. During the ensuing year he might have been found work- 
ing at his trade in an upholsterer's shop, and engaged to be married. Then 
suddenly, and quite without warning, the picture changed. The proba- 
10. N. Y. Times, April 22, 1936, p. 12, col. 5. 
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tioner, one Fiorenza by name, committed a brutal rape on a stranger 
who came to his notice as a customer of the shop, and then murdered her. 
It would be easy to say in retrospect that Fiorenza should never have 
been permitted to go at large on conviction of his earlier offense of theft. 
But to what institution could the court have committed Fiorenza with 
any assurance that its regime would transform him within a few years 
into a rehabilitated personality? His criminal record as of that date 
was, moreover, insignificant. There was no history of sex offenses. Even 
if he could have been transferred to a state hospital, is it not probable 
that he would soon thereafter have been let out "on furlough," if not 
simply released to make room for patients of a more obviously dangerous 
character? As for the alternative, any policy and practice which would 
have made possible the indefinite removal of Fiorenza from circulation 
on May 8, 1935, would presumably have meant similar treatment for 
thousands of others with not dissimilar records who have not yet com- 
mitted atrocious crimes. The great extension of governmental power 
with respect to the ordinary run of offenders implied in the current new 
penal demands is acknowledged by Dr. Winfred Overholser, a psychi- 
atrist prominently identified with practical public health administration 
in the field of mental diseases in Massachusetts: 
As a rule the psychopathic or otherwise pathological offender 
is subject to confinement for a shorter time, whereas perhaps he is 
the very one who should be confined for a wholly indefinite period! 
The popular notion that the psychiatrist wishes to see the offender 
turned loose upon society is far from the truth; many of those who 
are released at the expiration of sentence he would urge as candi- 
dates for prolonged segregation."" 
IV. 
The result of the foregoing considerations is that the case for the in- 
determinate commitment at any given time must rest on the contemporary 
state of three related variables. Two of these-the degree of perfection 
and availability of diagnostic facilities (or means for the scientific de- 
termination of parole eligibility), and the state of current resources for 
rehabilitation available in the jurisdiction - have been discussed. The 
third, partly because its bearing is so obvious and partly because any 
extended inquiry into its meaning had better be reserved for independent 
treatment, has not here been enlarged upon. It consists in the degree 
of scruple and enlightenment exhibited by the current selection of activi- 
ties which may be experienced as criminal. For the repressive sanctions 
of criminal law are and will continue to be applied not only to those who 
11. The Place of Psychiatry In the Criminal Law (1936) 16 B. U. L. REV. 322, 
326. 
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should by anyone's standards be considered dangerously unfit for society, 
but also to those whom organized majorities may choose at any time 
to treat as so unfit. 
Narrowing the discussion to the problem of rehabilitation, we have 
considered the social costs involved. These costs have here been stressed, 
but not for the purpose of reflecting adversely on any effective policy 
of rehabilitation. So to infer would be to miss the whole point. For 
we have also observed a certain prevailing and inherited lack of enthu- 
siasm on the part of our communities for any substantial incurring or 
payment of these costs. This does not mean that these selfsame com- 
munities are reconciled to the end products of existing non-rehabilitory 
regimes. To conclude thus would be to deny the evidence of one's senses. 
The status of this particular penal objective as it emerges from the dis- 
cussion seems rather to resemble that of the ideal of peace, of which 
it has been said that all men desire it, but very few desire those things 
which make for it. 
The resemblance of this conflict in our culture, considering the group 
emotional disturbances and behavior problems to which it gives rise, to 
what in an individual would be regarded as a psychopathic condition if 
not a progressive maladjustment, has already been noted. It seems not 
improbable that the future of criminal justice in our culture may be de- 
pendent on the extent and timing of recognition of this very maladjust- 
ment for what it is. This suggests the issue now confronting psychiatric 
participation. To focus dissatisfaction on the substantive law -be it 
the formulae of responsibility and of criminal intent or the relatively 
fixed penalty frames -or, for that matter, on procedure, while encour- 
aging the new popular penal standards, is to persist in the very confusion 
which makes this maladjustment possible. The psychiatrist, representing 
as he does in the popular mind a symbol of the more exacting new penal 
expectations, and of current dissatisfaction, must take care lest he find 
himself unwittingly sponsoring a psychopathic culture pattern. 
Nor is this hazard for the psychiatrist speculative and remote. Like all 
the rest of us he lives within and is subject to the pressures of a culture 
group. The history of medicine is replete with instances to demonstrate 
that it has been no easier for medical men in the past than for others 
to run counter to what dominant elements in the particular culture 
wanted to believe. Contemporary social and political adjustments on 
the part of the profession reinforce the trite observation that history 
has a way of repeating itself. One such adjustment - the role played 
by representative psychiatrists to date in the trial of accused persons 
who defend on the ground of irresponsibility- being still a live issue, 
affords a warning peculiarly pertinent to the present discussion. Let us 
consider the situation which arises when an accused interposes this de- 
fense. 
This content downloaded from 128.36.173.215 on Wed, 22 May 2013 13:21:46 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1938] PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 337 
In most of our jurisdictions the issue as legally framed stems from 
the doctrines laid down in M'Naghten's case, mentioned supra.'2 This 
means that the psychiatrist is asked to answer questions phrased in terms 
of "sanity" and "insanity", quite irrespective of the fact that these 
terms no longer correspond to valid medical or psychological concepts. 
And what is meant in the law by "insanity"? He is told that the question 
is whether the party accused, at the time of commission of the alleged 
offense, was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the 
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, 
or if he did know it, whether he knew that it was wrong. The psychi- 
atrist is thus confronted with what appear to him to be "criteria of 
responsibility which, as we have seen, are based upon antiquated psy- 
chological concepts and which are essentially metaphysical rather than 
psychiatric."'3 One can but conclude that, legal precedents notwith- 
standing, these are questions which cannot be answered by a psychiatrist, 
as a psychiatrist, and without shifting his role from that of a duly 
qualified expert to some other for which he has not been qualified as 
a witness. Such, indeed, appears to be the verdict of many of the medi- 
cal profession. 
How, then, have psychiatrists adjusted themselves to this seemingly 
impossible situation? One possibility would be to stand pat when brought 
into court, and simply refuse to commit oneself on such non-medical 
issues. This might have the advantageous effect of forcing the juris- 
prudential issue. Another possibility is to take the view that the respon- 
sibility for this anomalous situation must rest on "the law". The psy- 
chiatrist would then consider what appear to be the penal policies of the 
society wherein he is functioning, as expressed in that law and else- 
where. He could then conform his answer to those supposed policies. 
This course promises less friction, but involves the disadvantage of lend- 
ing an irrelevant sanction to the policies in question. As observed by 
Dr. Overholser: "So long as medical men are compelled to answer ques- 
tions on such non-medical topics as 'malice', 'right and wrong', and 
(criminal intent', so long will the expert be placed in a false light, and 
full justice at times fail to be done the accused."'4 
As this quotation implies, in its assumption that medical men are 
"compelled to answer," the latter of the alternative possible adjustments 
has thus far commended itself to the profession as the lesser of two evils, 
apparently pretty much as a matter of course. One might, indeed, query 
the compulsion. There is no law which requires an expert to render an 
opinion on a matter which he may consider outside the scope of his 
12. Supra note 8. 
13. Overholser, op. cit. supra note 10, at 329. 
14. Ibid. 
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expertness, and as to which he has in consequence no special knowledge. 
It is difficult to imagine a psychiatrist who chose not to answer questions 
such as these being punished for contempt. But in all probability Dr. 
Overholser did not have compulsion of this order in mind. There is 
unquestionably a more diffuse social compulsion to answer, and the 
point of the matter is that that pressure has shaped the psychiatrist's role. 
But in thus emphasizing the ambiguity of psychiatric participation, 
with its consequent hazard, there should be no question of minimizing 
the fact that criminal jurisprudence has been particeps criminis. Much 
the same conformity to the same cultural maladjustment has character- 
ized its record. Much the same issue now confronts it. Consider how 
the popular insistence on professed standards of a high order, coupled 
with a prevailing unwillingness to pay for more than symbolic perform- 
ance or to be otherwise bothered by the matter, has shaped the whole 
conception of this jurisprudence. The mechanism of conformity consists 
in the preservation of insulating distinctions between substantive law, 
procedure, and laws governing the set-up, personnel and resources of the 
agencies which are supposed to administer that substantive law. The 
first of these classes of law has always been emphasized in the law 
schools. To it, and usually to it alone, attention is directed when any 
question as to the penal policy of a state is raised. The second class of 
law - procedure - has received somewhat less scholarly emphasis. The 
third has received little or none, being set apart as of interest chiefly to 
politicians, administrators, and taxpayers associations concerned with the 
reduction of budgets. 
These anti-synthetical segregations of the legal subject matter ob- 
viously lend themselves to a glossing over of the maladjustment under 
discussion. For a legislature can say what they like in terms of sub- 
stantive law. If there be a glaring disproportion between the policy or 
enforcement assignment announced in the substantive enactment and 
the pertinent wherewithal provisions above grouped under Class III 
- which is more often than not the case - the professed policy or as- 
signment simply becomes to that extent a dead, but unacknowledgedly 
dead, letter. Formal redefinition of the professed policy or regulatory 
assignment in terms of the limiting conditions imposed by enactments 
of Class III has not been the rule in jurisprudential formulation any 
more than it has been in popular attitude. This tacit compromise by 
jurists, like the compromise by psychiatrists in the trial of insanity is- 
sues, of course serves to avoid considerable friction. But it runs counter 
to the spirit if not the letter of the legal canon of construction with 
reference to statutes in pari nmateria. It has had the disadvantageous 
effect of misrepresenting the law and misleading psychiatrists and the 
public as to the issues involved, just as lawyers and the public have been 
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mislead as to the precise bearing of psychiatry on the issue of criminal 
irresponsibility. 
On the assumption that maladjustments of this sort in a culture may 
well warrant a prognosis not dissimilar from that which would be sug- 
gested by a comparable maladjustment in an individual personality- 
namely, progressive deterioration failing some resolution of the conflicts 
in question-the resulting issue must be whether or not an appreciation 
of the conditions precedent is likely to become coupled in our culture 
with the desire for the ultimate result. The healthy penal adjustment 
unless, indeed, our culture can still afford the privileges of infancy 
would thus consist in professing policies looking toward the rehabilitation 
of offenders, and employing such professed policies as a premise, only 
to the extent to which we may be willing at the same time to assume 
collective responsibility for the welfare of that whole segment of human 
subnormality, wreckage and underprivilege, which we experience as crime 
or delinquency. Let us make no mistake about this. Given such cultures 
as we know, the welfare in question would have to include material as 
well as spiritual elements. Any very extensive program of rehabilitation 
would require an assumption of responsibility of a degree to which our 
communities are unaccustomed. For the strains and conditions which 
account for the deviational personalities and behavior in question run 
the whole gamut of human inequality and need. The criminal or de- 
linquent, viewed as a subject for treatment, does not differ as greatly 
in his processing needs from representatives of the other categories of 
social maladjustment and inequality as we have liked to believe.'5 Nor 
15. A somewhat different point of view is suggested by the Gluecks. See PRE- 
VENTING CRIME (1936) 1-5. This symposium depicts a variety of agencies and programs 
concerned with underprivileged and delinquent children in metropolitan areas. One third 
of those with whom the Lower West Side program in New York City was concerned 
lived in homes where the breadwinner was unemployed. Probably the same would have 
been true of those involved in the other studies. The children themselves would before 
very long have to face the problem of finding employment, and about that time they 
would pass out of the age group with which the agencies and programs described can 
concern themselves. Presumably these children, being by definition the least fit, would 
have more trouble than most in finding and holding jobs. It is scarcely to be supposed 
that such precarious adjustments as these agencies may be able to foster will weather 
unemployment for very long. But there is no discussion of the problem of unemploy- 
ment in general nor even of specific relief and work relief programs of the present 
and recent past. The families with which the same Lower West Side program was 
concerned averaged almost four children each, but the symposium contains no discussion 
of the problem of birth control. Most of these same families lived in the poorest grade 
of "old-law" tenement buildings, but the symposium is lacking in any consideration of 
slum clearance, low-cost housing, and resettlement programs. The editors concede 
that those administering the programs included "apparently recognize that the broadest 
and deepest attacks upon crime are beyond their control. They are therefore content to 
cultivate their own corners of the vineyard; to do as much good as lies within man- 
ageable territory." Id., at 5. 
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would it be easy to justify a rehabilitory policy toward criminals more 
generous than whatever may be the prevailing policy with respect to the 
other classes of unfortunates at any given time. As Walton H. Hamilton 
observes in his In Re the Small Debtor: "It is surprising that so much 
less has been said about the financial re-education of the bankrupt than 
the personal reform of the criminal."" Failing the adjustment outlined, 
the professing of policies of rehabilitation coupled with a pressure for 
increasingly indeterminate sentences (like the far-removed maxima and 
minima of many existing penalties for which the creation of parole 
boards has served as an excuse, and like the commitments authorized 
by the Juvenile Court laws) can mean nothing more nor less than a 
scrapping of those rather precious, if imperfect, guarantees of individual 
liberty which represent a substantial percentage of the profit of centuries, 
and which are summed up in the maxim "Nulla Poena Sine Lege."'17 
Why, then, is the symposium broadly entitled Preventing Crime? On what principle 
have national programs addressed to the very conditions typically found associated with 
delinquency, though much wider in their objectives, been excluded? The editors have 
anticipated this question and by way of answer proffer an analogy between fire control 
and crime prevention. Poverty, broken homes, ill health and other forms of under- 
privilege are termed "criminogenic combustibles." It is then pointed out that so far 
as fire prevention is concerned most of the places where combustibles are stored will 
never burn, and that in many instances an intervening influence between the inflam- 
mables and the conflagration is necessary. The implication for crime-preventive efforts 
then suggested is that the removal of criminogenic combustibles, while it would un- 
doubtedly decrease the possibility of "criminalistic conflagration", depends after all 
upon "community and societal planning in the social and economic realms"; and that 
"there is another aspect to the matter-that which is concerned with the translation of 
criminogenic inflammables into the fire of delinquency and crime, or the transformation 
of conditions into causes . . . " The conclusion advanced is that crime preventive 
programs "ought to stress means of avoiding fires (delinquency and crime) in a highly 
combustible (criminogenic) world", and that here mental hygiene and psychotherapy 
must play the chief roles. 
But the most striking feature of the various programs presented in this symposium 
as representative of crime preventive efforts is that they do seem to be instances of 
"community and social planning in the social and economic realms". They are, to be 
sure, of an extremely modest, uncontroversial and fragmentary character. But so are 
their results by the most sympathetic evaluation of their own sponsors. It is of course 
possible that we shall yet learn through the medium of mental hygiene and psycho- 
therapy to prevent more completely disturbances of the peace by the victims of social and 
economic inequality without substantially ameliorating their social and economic lot. 
But the programs included in the symposium, while extremely interesting in other 
connections, seem neither to afford illustrations of the course suggested nor to greatly 
advance the question as to how it shall be pursued. 
16. (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 473, 485. 
17. For an intensive study of the several meanings of this maxim, and of their 
history, see J. Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 165. 
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